The Great Carbon Market Debate – Why India's CCTS Targets Are Under Fire and What It Means for Your Business
Introduction: A Market Under Scrutiny
India's Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS) is less than a year away from its first compliance deadline. Trading is scheduled to begin in the fourth quarter of 2026. The regulatory architecture is in place. The Indian Carbon Market Portal is operational.
But a growing chorus of critics is asking a fundamental question: Is the CCTS designed to fail?
In July 2026, Climate Risk Horizons (CRH), a research organisation, released a critical evaluation of the emission reduction targets set under India's carbon market framework. The verdict was damning: the targets are "modest and unambitious" — unlikely to drive changes in operations that would reduce emissions substantially.
The report warns that low carbon credit prices and weak penalties could make it cheaper for companies to buy credits than invest in cleaner technologies, risking an oversupply of credits and undermining the market's effectiveness. For many high-margin polluters, "paying to pollute" could become a preferred business strategy.
This guide examines the debate surrounding India's carbon market targets, the criticisms levelled against them, what they mean for businesses, and the path forward.
The Climate Risk Horizons Report: "Modest and Unambitious"
The Report
On 29 July 2026, Climate Risk Horizons released a report titled "Unlocking Ambition for India's Carbon Credit Trading Scheme." The report evaluated the emission reduction targets set under the CCTS and found them to be "modest and unambitious" — unlikely to drive changes in operations that would reduce emissions substantially.
The Authors
The report was authored by Anirudh T.R., who warned that "for many high-margin polluters, 'paying to pollute' could become a preferred business strategy."
The Sectors Analysed
The analysis covers targets for three industries with global significance: the iron and steel, cement, and aluminium sectors. These are among India's largest industrial emitters and the backbone of the country's manufacturing economy.
The Key Findings
| Finding | Description |
|---|---|
| Weak Targets | The targets are "readily achievable" through incremental efficiency gains |
| Low Compliance Costs | The cost of purchasing credits is between 0.6% and 7% of profits |
| Oversupply Risk | Weak penalties could make it cheaper to buy credits than invest in cleaner technologies |
| No Deep Decarbonisation | 2-5% emission cuts by 2026-27 let heavy industries rely on minor efficiency tweaks |
The Significance
The report is significant because it comes from a credible research organisation and raises fundamental questions about the CCTS's ability to deliver meaningful emissions reductions. It has been covered by multiple media outlets, including Mongabay, Shankarias Parliament, and others.
The Numbers That Have Everyone Talking
The Steel Sector
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Number of steel/iron companies | 255 |
| Required reduction by 2026-27 | 6% |
| How it can be achieved | "Incremental improvements in process efficiency" |
The Cement Sector
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Average required reduction | 2-5% |
| How it can be achieved | Incremental efficiency gains |
The Compliance Cost
| Sector | Compliance Cost as % of Profits |
|---|---|
| Steel | 7% |
| Cement | 2% |
| Aluminium | 0.6% |
The Carbon Price
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Projected carbon price | $10 per tonne of CO₂ equivalent |
| International benchmark | Significantly higher |
The Emissions Coverage
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Current coverage | ~490 entities, ~477 million tCO₂e |
| Power sector emissions | ~55% of India's GHG emissions (excluded) |
What These Numbers Mean
| Implication | Description |
|---|---|
| Modest Targets | The required reductions are achievable with minimal investment |
| Low Compliance Costs | The financial incentive to reduce emissions is weak |
| No Deep Decarbonisation | Companies can meet targets without significant technological change |
| Oversupply Risk | Surplus credits could depress prices |
The "Pay to Pollute" Problem
The Core Argument
The CRH report warns that low carbon credit prices and weak penalties could make it cheaper for companies to buy credits than invest in cleaner technologies. This creates a situation where "paying to pollute" becomes a preferred business strategy.
How It Works
| Step | Description |
|---|---|
| 1. Modest Targets | Companies can meet targets through incremental improvements |
| 2. Low Penalties | The cost of non-compliance is low |
| 3. Cheap Credits | Carbon credits are cheap ($10/tonne) |
| 4. Rational Choice | It is cheaper to buy credits than invest in deep decarbonisation |
| 5. No Real Change | Emissions continue, credits are bought, and nothing fundamentally changes |
Why This Is a Problem
| Reason | Explanation |
|---|---|
| Greenwashing | Companies claim climate action while continuing to pollute |
| No Technological Shift | No investment in low-carbon technologies |
| Oversupply | Too many credits, prices collapse |
| Market Failure | The market fails its primary purpose |
The High-Margin Polluter Problem
For high-margin polluters, the cost of compliance is a small fraction of profits. In steel, the compliance cost is 7% of profits. In cement, it is 2%. In aluminium, it is just 0.6%. For these companies, it is rational to continue polluting and simply buy credits.
The International Comparison
India's projected carbon price of $10 per tonne is far below international benchmarks. The EU ETS price is significantly higher, creating a gap that could affect Indian exporters under CBAM.
The International Comparison: How India's Carbon Price Stacks Up
The Global Landscape
| Market | Carbon Price (Approx.) |
|---|---|
| EU ETS | €75+ per tonne |
| India CCTS (Projected) | $10 per tonne |
The CBAM Connection
India's steel and aluminium exports to the European Union (EU) fell 24.4% in FY 2025, with steel alone down 35.1%, before any CBAM financial obligation had taken effect.
The Competitive Disadvantage
| Implication | Description |
|---|---|
| Low Domestic Carbon Price | Indian companies face lower carbon costs domestically |
| High CBAM Costs | Indian exporters face high carbon costs in the EU |
| Competitive Gap | The gap between domestic and international carbon prices creates competitive pressure |
The IEEFA Perspective
Irrespective of the ongoing international discussions around CBAM, "a credible domestic carbon market can strengthen India's long-term industrial competitiveness."
The Power Sector Omission: 55% of Emissions Left Out
The Scale of the Gap
The power sector, responsible for approximately 55% of India's GHG emissions, is excluded from mandatory compliance and kept under voluntary participation.
Why This Matters
| Reason | Explanation |
|---|---|
| Largest Emitter | The single largest source of emissions is excluded |
| Weakened Price Signal | Reduced demand for credits |
| Incomplete Market | Missing the primary channel through which carbon pricing shapes energy investment |
| Competitive Distortion | Power sector faces no carbon compliance costs |
The International Experience
In other carbon markets, power utilities are among the most active participants. Their inclusion is essential for market liquidity and continuous price discovery. India's decision to exclude the power sector initially is a notable departure from international practice.
The IEEFA Warning
Without a credible integration roadmap, the CCTS will lack the primary channel through which carbon pricing shapes energy investment.
The Governance Gap: Who Watches the Watchmen?
The Problem
The CRH report recommends an independent regulator to ensure transparent governance and accelerate investment in low-carbon technologies.
What's Missing
| Element | Description |
|---|---|
| Independent Regulator | No independent body with real enforcement authority |
| Transparency | Limited public access to market data |
| Conflict of Interest | Government acts as regulator and operator |
What the Critics Are Saying
Researchers recommend "stronger carbon pricing safeguards, inclusion of major emitters like the power sector, and an independent regulator to ensure transparent governance and accelerate investment in low-carbon technologies."
What Best Practice Looks Like
International best practices call for:
- Reserve price floors to prevent prices from collapsing
- Stability reserves to manage supply
- Independent regulators to ensure enforcement
The Government's Defence: Pragmatism vs. Ambition
The Official Position
The government has not formally responded to the CRH report, but its position is clear: the CCTS is a pragmatic approach that accommodates industrial growth while building on existing institutional capabilities.
The Pragmatic Argument
| Argument | Description |
|---|---|
| Industrial Growth | India needs to grow its economy |
| Phase-in | Modest targets allow companies to adapt |
| Learning | The market needs time to develop |
| Institutional Capacity | Building MRV and enforcement capacity takes time |
The Counter-Argument
| Argument | Description |
|---|---|
| Climate Urgency | Emissions must be reduced urgently |
| Lost Opportunity | Weak targets mean lost abatement opportunities |
| Competitive Disadvantage | Low domestic carbon prices create CBAM exposure |
The Industry Perspective
Industry representatives argue that the targets are "readily achievable" and that the transition should be gradual to avoid economic disruption.
The Industry Perspective: A Measured Start or a Missed Opportunity?
What Industry Is Saying
| Argument | Description |
|---|---|
| Measured Start | The CCTS is a new market, and a gradual start is appropriate |
| Cost Management | Modest targets keep compliance costs manageable |
| Investment Planning | Companies need time to plan and invest |
What Critics Are Saying
| Argument | Description |
|---|---|
| Missed Opportunity | Weak targets mean missed abatement opportunities |
| No Real Change | Companies can meet targets without significant investment |
| Oversupply Risk | Surplus credits could depress prices |
The Middle Ground
| Position | Description |
|---|---|
| Gradual Tightening | Targets should become more ambitious over time |
| Phased-In Inclusion | The power sector should be included in future phases |
| Stronger Enforcement | Penalties must be meaningful |
The Environmental Perspective: Not Nearly Enough
What Environmentalists Are Saying
| Argument | Description |
|---|---|
| Not Enough | The targets are too weak to drive meaningful action |
| Pay to Pollute | Companies can continue polluting and buy credits |
| Missed Opportunity | The CCTS could have been a powerful tool |
The Carbon Market Paradox
| Paradox | Description |
|---|---|
| Market Mechanism | The CCTS is a market mechanism |
| Weak Targets | Weak targets mean weak market signals |
| No Incentive | Companies have no incentive to invest in deep decarbonisation |
What Would Make a Difference
| Change | Description |
|---|---|
| Ambitious Targets | Targets that require significant investment |
| Meaningful Penalties | Penalties that make non-compliance unattractive |
| Power Sector Inclusion | Including the largest emitter |
| Independent Regulator | Transparent governance and enforcement |
What This Debate Means for Businesses
For Obligated Entities
| Implication | Action Required |
|---|---|
| Low Compliance Costs | Compliance is likely to be inexpensive |
| No Pressure to Invest | Little incentive for deep decarbonisation |
| Oversupply Risk | Credits may be cheap and abundant |
For Project Developers
| Implication | Action Required |
|---|---|
| Low Credit Prices | Low demand = low prices |
| Oversupply Risk | Too many credits = price collapse |
| Market Credibility | Weak targets undermine market credibility |
For Exporters
| Implication | Action Required |
|---|---|
| CBAM Exposure | Low domestic carbon prices create CBAM exposure |
| Competitive Disadvantage | Gap between domestic and international carbon prices |
| Reputational Risk | Weak carbon performance may affect reputation |
The Strategic Response
| Strategy | Description |
|---|---|
| Monitor Developments | Stay informed about regulatory changes |
| Prepare for Tightening | Expect targets to become more ambitious |
| Build Internal Capacity | Develop expertise in carbon management |
| Engage with Policymakers | Provide input on future target design |
The Path Forward: Recommendations from the Critics
Recommendation 1: More Ambitious Future Targets
| Recommendation | Description |
|---|---|
| Ambitious Targets | Future compliance cycles need emission targets that strongly signal towards preventing long-term carbon lock-in |
| Tightening Trajectory | A predictable path for benchmark tightening |
Recommendation 2: Stronger Carbon Pricing Safeguards
| Recommendation | Description |
|---|---|
| Price Floor | Reserve price floors to prevent prices from collapsing |
| Stability Reserve | Supply adjustment mechanisms to manage oversupply |
| Penalties | Meaningful penalties for non-compliance |
Recommendation 3: Include Major Emitters
| Recommendation | Description |
|---|---|
| Power Sector Inclusion | The power sector, responsible for 55% of emissions, must be included |
| Phased Integration | A credible integration roadmap |
Recommendation 4: Independent Regulator
| Recommendation | Description |
|---|---|
| Independent Regulator | An independent body to ensure transparent governance |
| Enforcement | Real enforcement authority |
Recommendation 5: Transparent Governance
| Recommendation | Description |
|---|---|
| Transparency | Public access to market data |
| Accountability | Clear accountability mechanisms |
The IEEFA Perspective
As the IEEFA report notes, "communicating clear long-term targets and having a predictable path for benchmark changes are particularly important as industrial investment decisions often span 15–30 years and require confidence in the durability of the price signal."
The IEEFA Perspective: Sequencing and the Window of Opportunity
The Core Finding
A new report by the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) maps the trajectory of the CCTS and makes recommendations on the decisions that will shape the scheme's trajectory.
The Sequencing Principle
"Determining its trajectory now is sequencing choices, and the window to shape them is open before path dependencies harden. Priority should go to foundational elements: credible stringency, robust MRV, and genuine enforcement."
The Window of Opportunity
Over the next two to five years, choices made by regulators, policymakers, and market participants will shape how far the CCTS develops into a market capable of guiding capital-intensive industrial investment over 15- to 30-year horizons.
The Opportunity for India
India has the advantage of learning from the costly missteps of earlier movers. The CCTS can avoid the oversupply, weak price signals, and enforcement failures that have challenged carbon markets worldwide.
Our Services
| Service | What We Do |
|---|---|
| Compliance Assessment | Understand your obligations and assess your position |
| Policy Monitoring | Track regulatory changes and enforcement developments |
| Gap Analysis | Calculate your shortfall and develop a mitigation strategy |
| Credit Procurement | Help you buy CCCs at the best price |
| Strategic Advisory | Position your business for the evolving regulatory landscape |
| Legal Documentation | Draft watertight agreements and handle regulatory filings |
Why Choose Carboned.in?
| Reason | Why It Matters |
|---|---|
| Legal Expertise | Led by Siddharth Gupta, Advocate, Calcutta High Court |
| Regulatory Knowledge | Deep understanding of CCTS, BEE, and enforcement mechanisms |
| Market Intelligence | Real-time insights on pricing and compliance trends |
| End-to-End Support | From assessment to compliance |
Your first consultation is completely free. No obligation. Just honest advice.
Conclusion: A Market at a Crossroads
India's Carbon Credit Trading Scheme is at a crossroads. The criticisms levelled by Climate Risk Horizons and others raise fundamental questions about whether the CCTS is designed to drive real decarbonisation or merely create a paper market.
Key Takeaways
| Aspect | What You Need to Know |
|---|---|
| CRH Report | Targets are "modest and unambitious" |
| Compliance Costs | 0.6-7% of profits |
| Carbon Price | $10/tonne (far below international benchmarks) |
| Power Sector | 55% of emissions excluded |
| Pay to Pollute | Could become a preferred strategy |
| Way Forward | Ambitious targets, stronger safeguards, independent regulator |
The Choice Is Yours
| Option | Outcome |
|---|---|
| Understand the debate | Position your business for the evolving regulatory landscape |
| Ignore the debate | Face higher costs, missed opportunities, competitive disadvantage |
How Carboned.in can help
Our team covers every dimension of India's carbon market — pick the service that matches where you are.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the Climate Risk Horizons report?+
A critical evaluation of CCTS emission reduction targets, released on 29 July 2026, finding them "modest and unambitious."
What are the key findings of the report?+
The targets are readily achievable, compliance costs are low (0.6-7% of profits), and weak penalties could make "paying to pollute" a preferred business strategy.
How much do steel companies need to reduce emissions?+
255 steel and iron companies are required to reduce their emissions intensity by 6% by 2026-27.
What is the projected carbon price in India?+
Approximately $10 per tonne of CO₂ equivalent.
Why is the power sector excluded from the CCTS?+
The power sector, responsible for 55% of India's GHG emissions, is excluded from mandatory compliance and kept under voluntary participation.
What is the "pay to pollute" problem?+
Low carbon prices and weak penalties make it cheaper for companies to buy credits than invest in cleaner technologies.
What is the international comparison for carbon prices?+
India's projected carbon price of $10 per tonne is far below international benchmarks like the EU ETS.
What do the critics recommend?+
More ambitious targets, stronger carbon pricing safeguards, inclusion of major emitters like the power sector, and an independent regulator.
What is the IEEFA's position?+
The window to shape the CCTS's trajectory is open before path dependencies harden. Priority should go to foundational elements: credible stringency, robust MRV, and genuine enforcement.
How can Carboned.in help?+
We provide compliance assessment, policy monitoring, gap analysis, credit procurement, strategic advisory, and legal documentation. ---
Siddharth Gupta is the founder of Carboned.in and specialist counsel for India's carbon compliance framework — advising obligated entities, project developers, and buyers on CCTS, CR-I registration, and credit transactions.