CCTS Price Discovery and Benchmarking – How India's Carbon Market Will Find Its Equilibrium Price
Introduction: The Price Question That Defines the Market
As India's Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS) prepares for its first trading cycle—expected to begin around October 2026—one question dominates every conversation among obligated entities, investors, and policymakers: What will a carbon credit cost?
The answer is not a simple number. Carbon price formation in the CCTS reflects the interaction of regulatory design, firm-level abatement decisions, macroeconomic conditions, and companion policy dynamics. These forces interact through feedback loops that will determine whether the CCTS produces a carbon price capable of guiding the capital-intensive, long-term investments that India's industrial decarbonisation requires.
Getting the price signal right early is key to the credibility of India's carbon market. Without a credible price signal, the CCTS risks becoming an administrative compliance exercise with limited influence on India's decarbonisation trajectory.
This guide provides a comprehensive analysis of how price discovery will work in India's CCTS—the starting point, the mechanisms, the risks, and what entities should plan for.
The Starting Point: What We Know About the Initial Price
The IIT Roorkee Modelling
A central focus of a high-level workshop organised by IEEFA, IIT Roorkee, and the Environmental Defense Fund was a detailed modelling framework developed by IIT Roorkee. The model integrates facility-level data across sectors such as cement, aluminium and textiles, enabling scenario analysis of emissions reductions and carbon pricing.
Preliminary findings suggested a potential market-clearing carbon price of around $11.48 per credit under baseline assumptions.
The Government's Target
India's starting price target is intentionally low at around $10 per tonne, consistent with a learning phase approach that allows market participants to adapt without economic shock.
The Price Corridor
Under the CERC's 2026 regulations, certificates traded under the compliance mechanism will have a Floor Price (minimum) and a Forbearance Price (maximum), both approved by CERC. This price corridor is designed to prevent excessive volatility in the early years of the market.
What This Means
| Aspect | Implication |
|---|---|
| Initial price | ~$10-11.50 per tonne |
| Price corridor | Prevents extreme volatility |
| Learning phase | Prices expected to rise over time |
The IIT Roorkee Modelling Framework: $11.48 Per Credit
The Model's Purpose
The IIT Roorkee modelling framework is designed to guide policy decisions by integrating facility-level data and enabling scenario analysis. Experts stressed that such models should be used to understand trade-offs and directional trends rather than produce precise forecasts, particularly given current data limitations.
The Baseline Assumptions
The $11.48 figure represents a market-clearing price under baseline assumptions. This means it is the price at which the quantity of carbon credits demanded by obligated entities equals the quantity supplied.
Sectoral Insights
The analysis indicated significant emissions reduction potential in sectors such as textiles and paper, while overall industrial output impacts were expected to remain minimal.
The ICRA ESG View
At an assumed carbon price of $10 per tonne of CO₂, profitability for some cement companies could be hit by up to 19 per cent, while aluminium players may see a hit of around 3 per cent. ICRA noted that India's carbon trading scheme may raise costs over time as emission targets tighten.
The Price Corridor: Floor and Forbearance Prices
The Mechanism
The CERC's 2026 regulations establish price controls to maintain market stability:
| Price Control | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Floor Price | Minimum trading price—prevents prices from collapsing |
| Forbearance Price | Maximum trading price—prevents excessive spikes |
The Rationale
Price controls in early-stage carbon markets serve several purposes:
- Prevent excessive volatility that could undermine confidence
- Provide price certainty for investment decisions
- Prevent market manipulation
- Support orderly market development
The Trade-Off
While some participants advocated introducing price controls early on, others warned that excessive intervention could distort price discovery. The challenge is balancing stability with market-driven price formation.
The IEEFA View
The IEEFA has advocated for a Price and Supply Adjustment Mechanism (PSAM) comprising consignment auctions, vintage-based credit classification, and a price corridor. Drawing on evidence from the EU ETS, Alberta's TIER system, and Australia's Safeguard Mechanism, the IEEFA has shown that delayed intervention invariably proves costlier and more politically contentious than preventive design.
How Price Discovery Works in an Intensity-Based System
The Core Mechanism
The CCTS regulates emissions intensity rather than imposing an absolute cap like the EU-ETS. This means aggregate allowable emissions will scale with output, accommodating India's industrial growth trajectory but creating a structural tension at the heart of price formation.
The Supply-Demand Dynamic
Output expansion simultaneously generates:
| Effect | Description |
|---|---|
| Credit supply | From efficient firms outperforming their benchmarks |
| Credit demand | From less-efficient firms falling short of their benchmarks |
Whether the market tightens or loosens in any period depends on which firms are driving growth and how regulators calibrate benchmarks relative to realised sectoral performance.
Ex-Post Issuance
As the system issues credits only after verified performance against facility-level benchmarks, tradable supply enters the market with a lag. Banking behaviour, verification timelines, and firms' willingness to sell all create a gap between what the system can generate and what reaches the market.
The Price Formation Framework
| Layer | Component |
|---|---|
| Economic basis | Artificial scarcity via policy design—baselines, targets, and abatement actions define credit supply |
| Core mechanism | Intensity-based benchmarks, performance-based credit generation (ex post), credit trading and intertemporal banking |
| Adjustment instruments | PSAM, banking, price corridor, credit reserve and vintage management |
The Benchmark Calibration Problem
Why Benchmarking Matters
Benchmark calibration is the central mechanism for shaping the price signal. In India's intensity-based system, output growth can generate both credit supply and credit demand depending on which firms drive growth.
The Risk of Lenient Benchmarks
In jurisdictions where benchmark-setting has relied too heavily on industry-provided estimates without independent verification, allocations have consistently been more generous than necessary. Credible scarcity requires pre-committed tightening trajectories reinforced by transparent, rule-based supply adjustment mechanisms.
The PAT Experience
By the time trading opened under PAT, 103 lakh Energy Saving Certificates (ESCerts) had been issued across the first three PAT cycles against a total purchase obligation of only 52 lakh. This reflected substantial oversupply, driven in part by targets that proved relatively easy to achieve.
The CCTS Vulnerability
The CCTS is vulnerable to similar challenges, not only because these are inherent risks of a baseline-and-credit system, but also because it will regulate many of the same entities that operated under PAT. Over a decade, these entities learned that non-compliance carried few meaningful consequences.
The Solution
Credible, pre-committed tightening trajectories and rule-based supply adjustment mechanisms are essential to sustain scarcity.
Output-Based Allocation and Its Effect on Price Signals
What Is Output-Based Allocation?
Output-based allocation (OBA) ties allowable emissions to production output. This means that, unlike an absolute cap, emissions allowances scale with production levels.
The Effect on Price Signals
Output-based allocation mutes the transmission of carbon costs into product prices, weakening demand-side signals for material efficiency and substitution even when the underlying carbon price is positive.
What This Means
| Effect | Implication |
|---|---|
| Weaker demand signals | Consumers don't see carbon costs reflected in prices |
| Reduced substitution incentives | Less incentive to switch to lower-carbon products |
| Muted investment signals | Weaker signals for capital allocation |
The Structural Tension
Output-based allocation accommodates India's industrial growth trajectory but creates a structural tension at the heart of price formation. The system accommodates growth but makes price signals more complex to interpret.
The Role of Banking in Price Formation
What Is Banking?
Banking allows entities to save surplus credits for future compliance cycles. The CCTS allows unlimited banking of Carbon Credit Certificates across compliance cycles.
The Effect on Prices
| Effect | Explanation |
|---|---|
| Price smoothing | Banking allows entities to smooth compliance costs over time |
| Supply management | Entities can hold credits, reducing immediate supply |
| Future price expectations | Banking decisions reflect expectations of future prices |
The Risk
The conversion of banked ESCerts into CCCs, if undertaken without strict eligibility criteria, could flood the market with legacy credits before a meaningful price signal has emerged. The choice of conversion rates and the design of any parallel operating period between PAT and the CCTS will therefore serve as early indicators of whether the new regime intends to enforce stricter market discipline.
The Intertemporal Effect
Ex-post credit issuance, the exclusion of financial intermediaries, and capital-intensive industrial abatement mean both supply and demand will remain relatively inelastic in the early years, with trading likely to cluster around settlement deadlines.
The Power Sector Exclusion: What It Means for Price Discovery
The Numbers
The power sector accounts for roughly 40% of national emissions. Its exclusion from the initial phase of the CCTS simplifies implementation but has significant implications for price discovery.
The Impact on Price Discovery
| Impact | Explanation |
|---|---|
| Removes largest emission source | Significantly reduces market size |
| Eliminates fuel-switching channel | No coal-gas merit-order dynamics |
| Removes continuous traders | Utilities trade continuously in other markets |
| Concentrates demand | Trading may cluster around settlement deadlines |
The IEEFA Analysis
The initial exclusion of the power sector removes the single largest emission source, the primary fuel-switching channel, and a class of participants that trade continuously. Demand concentrates instead among industrial firms whose compliance requirements evolve more slowly and whose trading may cluster around settlement deadlines, weakening the informational content of periodic market-clearing prices.
The Future Integration Challenge
Any future power sector integration will need to address the statutory tariff determination process under the Electricity Act 2003, which lacks an established framework for treating carbon compliance costs as a legitimate, automatic pass-through. Without a credible integration roadmap, the CCTS will continue to operate without the primary transmission channel through which carbon pricing shapes energy investment decisions.
The Risk of Oversupply: Lessons from PAT and Korea
The PAT Oversupply
| Metric | PAT |
|---|---|
| ESCerts issued | 103 lakh |
| Purchase obligation | 52 lakh |
| Unacquired ESCerts | 34 lakh |
The substantial oversupply was driven in part by targets that proved relatively easy to achieve. Regulatory decisions did little to strengthen market discipline—entities that failed to meet their obligations in cycles I and II were not barred from participating in trading during cycle III.
The Korea Experience
In Korea, restricting early participation to compliance entities, alongside a surplus of allowances, left trading thin and prices subdued in the scheme's initial years.
The Shared Lesson
Market depth and price signals depend first on whether targets create genuine compliance pressure, and then on whether that pressure is consistently maintained.
The CCTS Risk
The CCTS is vulnerable to similar challenges. Without credible scarcity and enforcement, the market could suffer from:
- Thin trading volumes
- Subdued prices
- Weak investment signals
- Limited emission reductions
The EU-ETS Lesson: Why Market Stability Mechanisms Matter
The EU Experience
The EU-ETS recovered meaningful price signals only after structural reforms, notably the Market Stability Reserve (MSR), replaced ad-hoc interventions with automatic supply correction.
The Lesson for India
India's CCTS will need equivalent mechanisms to anchor expectations and sustain the forward-looking participation that stable price signals depend on.
The IEEFA Recommendation
The IEEFA has recommended that the CCTS embed a Price and Supply Adjustment Mechanism (PSAM) from the outset. Drawing on evidence from the EU ETS, Alberta's TIER system, and Australia's Safeguard Mechanism, the IEEFA has shown that delayed intervention invariably proves costlier and more politically contentious than preventive design.
The PSAM Components
| Component | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Consignment auctions | Supply management |
| Vintage-based credit classification | Quality differentiation |
| Price corridor | Volatility prevention |
Companion Policies and Their Effect on Carbon Prices
What Are Companion Policies?
Companion policies are other policy instruments that affect emissions in covered sectors independently of the carbon price. These include:
| Policy | Effect |
|---|---|
| PAT scheme | Energy efficiency improvements |
| Renewable Consumption Obligations (RCO) | Renewable energy deployment |
| Production-Linked Incentives (PLI) | Industrial policy |
| National Green Hydrogen Mission | Hydrogen deployment |
The Problem
Instruments such as ESCerts, RCOs, PLI schemes, and the National Green Hydrogen Mission affect emissions in covered sectors independently of the carbon price. Without periodic baseline revisions reflecting their cumulative impact, the resulting surpluses can depress prices and blur what the CCTS price signals about in-sector abatement costs.
The Risk
International experience, particularly the EU-ETS waterbed effect, underscores the importance of dynamic baseline revision and unified registries to prevent double counting.
The Solution
| Action | Why |
|---|---|
| Periodic baseline revisions | Reflect cumulative impact of companion policies |
| Dynamic adjustment | Maintain scarcity and price signals |
| Unified registries | Prevent double counting |
Price Evolution: Three Stages of Development
The IEEFA Framework
The IEEFA identifies three stages of development for the CCTS:
| Stage | Features | Price Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Phase 1: Initial | Introduction of CCTS, policy framework, MRV standards | Low prices, learning phase |
| Phase 2: Maturation | Sectoral expansion, financial market integration, offset design | Rising prices, deeper liquidity |
| Phase 3: Full Maturity | International positioning, full financialisation | Higher prices, global convergence |
Price Expectations by Phase
| Phase | Expected Price Range |
|---|---|
| Phase 1 (2026-27) | $10-15 per tonne |
| Phase 2 (2028-30) | $15-25 per tonne |
| Phase 3 (2031-33) | $25-40+ per tonne |
The Key Determinants
| Factor | Impact on Price Evolution |
|---|---|
| Benchmark calibration | Primary lever for scarcity |
| Power sector inclusion | Major demand increase |
| Financial participation | Liquidity and price discovery |
| CBAM recognition | Export demand |
| Companion policy coordination | Supply adjustment |
The 15-30 Year Investment Horizon
Why Long-Term Signals Matter
Communicating clear long-term targets and a predictable path for benchmark tightening is particularly important given that industrial investment decisions span 15 to 30 years. Forward guidance and well-designed stability mechanisms can help firms integrate carbon costs into long-term planning.
The IEEFA Warning
The choices made over the next two to five years will determine whether the CCTS produces a carbon price signal strong enough to guide capital-intensive industrial investment over 15- to 30-year horizons.
What This Means for Entities
| Implication | Action |
|---|---|
| Price will rise over time | Plan for higher future prices |
| Investment decisions span decades | Factor carbon costs into long-term planning |
| Policy certainty is essential | Engage with policymakers for clear trajectories |
Price Expectations: What Entities Should Plan For
The Starting Point
| Aspect | Expectation |
|---|---|
| Initial price | ~$10-11.50 per tonne |
| Price corridor | Floor and forbearance prices |
| Early years | Learning phase, limited liquidity |
The Medium-Term
| Aspect | Expectation |
|---|---|
| 2028-30 | $15-25 per tonne |
| Drivers | Tighter targets, sector expansion |
| Risk | Oversupply could suppress prices |
The Long-Term
| Aspect | Expectation |
|---|---|
| 2031-33+ | $25-40+ per tonne |
| Drivers | Power sector inclusion, financialisation, CBAM |
| Risk | Policy uncertainty |
Strategic Implications
| Entity Type | Strategy |
|---|---|
| Obligated entities | Procure early, invest in abatement, hedge price risk |
| Project developers | Register early, focus on quality |
| Investors | Position for long-term price growth |
How Carboned.in Can Help
At Carboned.in, we help businesses understand and navigate carbon price dynamics with clarity and confidence.
Our Services
| Service | What We Do |
|---|---|
| Price Intelligence | Provide price forecasts and market analysis |
| Price Risk Management | Develop hedging strategies |
| Compliance Strategy | Optimise procurement timing |
| Investment Advisory | Identify opportunities from price trends |
| Regulatory Intelligence | Stay informed of price-related developments |
Why Choose Carboned.in?
| Reason | Why It Matters |
|---|---|
| Legal Expertise | Led by Siddharth Gupta, Advocate, Calcutta High Court |
| Regulatory Knowledge | Deep understanding of price formation mechanisms |
| Market Intelligence | Real-time insights on price trends |
| End-to-End Support | From strategy to execution |
Your first consultation is completely free. No obligation. Just honest advice.
Conclusion
The price of a carbon credit is not just a number—it is a signal. A signal that guides investment, shapes strategy, and determines whether India's carbon market succeeds in its mission.
Starting low and rising over time, India's carbon price will evolve as the market matures, targets tighten, and CBAM pressures mount. The choices made over the next two to five years—on benchmark calibration, power sector inclusion, financialisation, and companion policy coordination—will shape the price trajectory for decades.
Key Takeaways
| Aspect | What You Need to Know |
|---|---|
| Initial Price | ~$10-11.50 per tonne |
| Price Corridor | Floor and forbearance prices |
| Key Mechanism | Benchmark calibration |
| Risk | Oversupply from lenient benchmarks |
| EU Lesson | Market Stability Reserve essential |
| Power Sector | Exclusion limits price discovery |
| Long-Term | Prices expected to rise to $25-40+ |
The Choice Is Yours
| Option | Outcome |
|---|---|
| Understand price dynamics | Procure strategically, invest wisely, manage risk |
| Ignore price signals | Face higher costs, miss opportunities |
How Carboned.in Can Help
At Carboned.in, we help businesses understand and navigate carbon price dynamics with clarity and confidence.
- Price Intelligence: Understand price trends and forecasts
- Price Risk Management: Develop hedging strategies
- Compliance Strategy: Optimise procurement timing
- Investment Advisory: Identify opportunities
Your first consultation is completely free. No obligation. Just honest advice.
How Carboned.in can help
Our team covers every dimension of India's carbon market — pick the service that matches where you are.
Frequently Asked Questions
What will a carbon credit cost in India?+
Starting around $10-11.50 per tonne, with prices expected to rise over time to $25-40+ per tonne by the early 2030s.
What is the price corridor?+
Floor and forbearance prices approved by CERC to prevent excessive volatility.
How does price discovery work in an intensity-based system?+
Prices reflect the balance between credit supply from efficient firms and credit demand from less-efficient firms, mediated by benchmark calibration.
What is the risk of oversupply?+
If benchmarks are too lenient, surplus credits can depress prices, as happened under PAT and in Korea.
What is the IIT Roorkee modelling finding?+
A potential market-clearing carbon price of around $11.48 per credit under baseline assumptions.
Why does the power sector exclusion matter?+
It removes the single largest emission source and the primary fuel-switching channel, limiting price discovery.
What are companion policies?+
Policies like PAT, RCO, and PLI that affect emissions independently of the carbon price and can depress prices if not coordinated.
What is the EU-ETS lesson?+
Market Stability Mechanisms like the MSR are essential for maintaining credible price signals.
What is the 15-30 year horizon?+
Industrial investment decisions span decades and require confidence in the durability of the price signal.
How can entities manage price risk?+
Through early procurement, abatement investment, and hedging strategies.
When will trading begin?+
Expected in October 2026.
How can Carboned.in help?+
We provide price intelligence, price risk management, compliance strategy, and regulatory intelligence.
Siddharth Gupta is the founder of Carboned.in and specialist counsel for India's carbon compliance framework — advising obligated entities, project developers, and buyers on CCTS, CR-I registration, and credit transactions.